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1 Introduction
Should a society apt for a centralized scal system under which spending decisions are
made by a central authority and nanced from general tax revenues or should it apt for
a decentralized system in which scal choices are made by local authorities and nanced
by local taxes? In his seminal work on economic federalism, Oates (1972) answered this
question by highlighting a trade o¤between internalization of externalities and the capacity
of the state to cater for regional di¤erences in taste. His famous Decentralization Theorem
states that decentralization is desirable if externalities are weak and regional di¤erences
in taste are large.1 Clearly such economic trade o¤s are important, yet the design of
the scal state has equally important political economy implications. This is because
political ine¢ ciencies are a¤ected by the degree of centralization of the scal state. This
has been explored in a growing literature on the political economy of scal federalism.2
This literature, which we discuss in more detail below, has identied various political trade
o¤s as well as reasons why the economic trade o¤s are a¤ected by politics. This paper
makes a contribution to this literature by pointing to a new and important political cost of
centralization: governance uncertainty. It explores how governance uncertainty a¤ects the
trade o¤ between internalization of externalities under centralization and the perceived
benets of electoral accountability under decentralization.
The general framework of our analysis is the common agency model with governance
uncertainty studied by Aidt and Dutta (2004). This model portrays a society populated
by heterogenous groups of voters (e.g., living in di¤erent regions) with conicting policy
preferences. The groups of voters (the principals) use elections to hold an opportunistic or
rent seeking politician (the agent) accountable for his policy choices while in o¢ ce. They
do so by voting retrospectively in an innite sequence of elections, as in Ferejohn (1986),
1This result is, as pointed out by Besley and Coate (2004), driven by the somewhat articial assumption
that the federal government cannot tailor spending to regional di¤erences in taste. See Harstad (2007) for
a rationale for why it might be politically optimal to select uniform federal policies.
2See, e.g., Seabright (1996); Crémer and Palfrey (1996, 2000); Edwards and Keen (1996); Dixit and
Londregan (1998); Lockwood (2002, 2008); Luelfesman (2002); Besley and Coate (2003); Dur and Roelf-
sema (2005); Tommasi and Weinschelbaum (2007); and Bordignon et al. (2008).
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Persson et al. (1997) or Coate and Morris (1999). The critical new feature of the analysis
is that ex ante before each election the politician is uncertain about which group will
be pivotal in deciding the outcome of the election. We call this governance uncertainty.
Governance uncertainty has many di¤erent sources, as we discuss in more detail below.
To be concrete, however, we relate it to random events that a¤ect the electoral turnout
rate of voters in di¤erent groups.3 These random turnout shocks, which we assume to be
correlated within groups but not between groups, introduce uncertainty from the point of
view of the politician as to which of group holds the majority amongst those voters who
actually turn out to vote in any given election. An example of what we have in mind is
randomuctuations in weather conditions in di¤erent locations. As in Roemer (1998), such
uctuations are to a rst approximation uncorrelated across regions and induce random
turnouts in elections.
We adopt this general setting to revisit one of the classical questions of scal federal-
ism: when should provision of local public goods be centralized? Our analysis highlights
a new political cost of centralization. This cost arises because turnout uncertainty is more
pronounced at the federal level than at the regional level. As a consequence, centralization
may be associated with a loss of electoral accountability. The nature of this loss, however,
depends on the direction of the externality associated with provision of local public goods.
We identify an important asymmetry between situations with positive and negative ex-
ternalities. With negative externalities, voters are forced to accept more rent seeking in a
centralized federation than when scal decisions are decentralised to the regions. Conse-
quently, centralization entails a loss of accountability that must be traded o¤ against the
benets of internalizing externalities. Centralization is only Pareto e¢ cient if the (neg-
ative) externality is su¢ ciently strong. With positive externalities, on the other hand,
centralization does not entail a loss of accountability per se. Yet, even when the regions of
the federation are identical in all respects, centralization is not necessarily Pareto e¢ cient
despite the presence of (positive) externalities.
The organization of the scal state is not just a question of theoretical interest. It is an
3See Dhillon and Peralta (2002) for a good survey of the literature on voter turnout.
3
issue of great practical importance as well. The ongoing debate about the appropriate role
of the European Union is just one example this. Another is the view that a reorganization
of the scal state towards more a decentralized structure is one very promising way to
increase e¢ ciency and fairness in provision of public goods in less developed countries
(Santos (1998); Bardhan (2000)). Finally, the analysis can provide insights into the forces
that stabilize and destabilize federal scal structures.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we discuss the related
literature and put our contribution in context. In section 3, we present a general political
(common) agency model with governance uncertainty and introduce and discuss the main
assumptions. In section 4, we present the characterization results from Aidt and Dutta
(2004). We provide complete proofs in Appendix I. In section 5, we tailor the general
model to the case of local public goods and scal federalism and present the main results
of the paper. In section 6, we discuss the implications of our analysis for scal integration
and disintegration. In section 7, we summarize and discuss a number of extensions.
2 Related literature
The literature on the political economy of scal federalism has been surveyed by, for
example, Inman and Rubinfeld (1997) and Lockwood (2006), and we shall only attempt
to cover the most direct links to our analysis here.
Our paper is most directly related to the work by Seabright (1996), Tommasi andWein-
schelbaum (2007), Bordignon et al. (2008) and Hindriks and Lockwood (2009). Seabright
(1996) argues that political accountability is weakened when public spending decisions are
centralized. He measures this e¤ect as the reduction in the probability that a given region
can determine the re-election of the government. In our model, this notion is made precise.
The political clout of a region is determined by the probability that voters of that region
holds the majority among those who turn out to vote in the federation. Importantly,
whether the reduction, implied by centralization, in the probability that a given region
can determine the re-election of the government leads to a loss of political accountability
depends on the nature of the externalities associated with provision of local public goods,
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as discussed above. This is a new insight. Tommasi and Weinschelbaum (2007) study
the question of centralization versus decentralization within the framework of a common
agency model. They allow the principals (citizens of the regions within the country) to o¤er
monetary rewards to either the federal politician (under centralization) or to the regional
politicians (under decentralization). They identify a trade o¤ between internalization of
externalities and the coordination failure that arises among the principles when scal de-
cisions are centralized. One can interpret the trade o¤ that we highlight in a similar way,
but with two important di¤erences. One di¤erence is that we focus on the implicit incen-
tives that the threat of termination of o¢ ce can provide rather than the explicit incentives
provided by monetary payments. Another di¤erence is that we allow for positive as well
as negative externalities and show that this distinction matters in important ways for the
nature of the coordination failure. Bordignon et al. (2008) also nd that the distinction
between positive and negative externalities matters within a lobbying model similar to
that of Tommasi and Weinschelbaum (2007). The reason is, however, very di¤erent from
the one highlighted by our analysis. It has to do with the fact that lobbying under decen-
tralization may partly compensate for the fact that local public goods are under-provided,
but only if the externality is positive. Hindriks and Lockwood (2009) stress that voters
are often poorly informed about policy outcomes, not only in other districts but also in
their own, and that elections, in addition to their disciplining role, also serve as a selection
devise. As in our context, scal centralization reduces electoral accountability, but this
e¤ect is counteracted by a selection e¤ect that encourages "bad" incumbents to pretend
to be "good". Our analysis abstracts from the selection e¤ects in order to stress the e¤ect
of governance uncertainty on electoral accountability.
Our paper is also related to the works by Besley and Coate (2003), Dur and Roelf-
sema (2005) and Lockwood (2002; 2008). Besley and Coate (2003) identify two important
political e¤ects of centralization. These are related to di¤erent legislative procedures at
the federal level. First, centralization induces uncertainty as to whether or not the rep-
resentative from a particular region will be include in the minimum winning coalition
that determines policy. Second, when policy making at the federal level is determined
by bargaining between representatives from di¤erent regions, regional voters may have
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an incentive to delegate strategically and elect a politician that cares a lot about public
spending. In both cases, a trade o¤ between the political distortion (uncertainty or strate-
gic delegation) and the benets of internalizing (positive) externalities determines whether
or not centralization is benecial. Besley and Coate nd that centralization is, typically,
benecial if the externality is strong enough. Dur and Roelfsema (2005), however, extend
this analysis to show that centralization may fail to internalize externalities if the cost of
public policy cannot be shared among the regions. Luelfesmann et al. (2008) furthermore
argue that Besley and Coate (2003) underplay the scope for bargaining amongst regions
and show that decentralization tends to dominate centralization when this is taken into
account.4 Like Besley and Coate (2003), we also focus on the uncertainty that arises
when scal decisions are centralized, but we stress governance uncertainty rather than
uncertainty about being included in the minimum winning coalition. It is interesting to
notice that decentralization, in our model, can only Pareto dominate centralization in the
presence of a negative externality a case that Besley and Coate (2003) do not consider.5
Moreover, while we do not allow bargaining among regions, we do not allow this at the
federal level either. This simplication allows us to isolate the key political economy trade
o¤ in a simple and transparent way.
Lockwood (2002) argues that centralization leads to ine¢ cient outcomes when regional
representatives vote over agendas that contain sets of region-specic projects. The prob-
lem is that the political choice is not tailored su¢ ciently to within-region benets. Thus,
centralization entails a classical trade o¤ between catering for regional di¤erences and in-
ternalizing externalities. Importantly, however, the political distortions imply that weaker
externalities and heterogeneity between regions need not increase the e¢ ciency gain from
decentralizations. In our model, there is no regional di¤erences with regard to the bene-
ts of public goods. Nonetheless, we nd an interesting asymmetry between positive and
4A similar conclusion is reached by Cheikbossian (2000). He shows that with a decentralized scal
structure voters strategically elect representatives to eliminate any element of cooperation between rep-
resentatives at the decision-making stage and that this tend to work against centralization. See also
Luelfesman (2002) who shows that with linear cost sharing rules decentralization typically is socially
optimal.
5Besley and Coate (2003) make welfare comparisons based on aggregate public goods surplus.
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negative externalities which provides a complementary example of how politics can change
the classical trade o¤s in surprising ways. Lockwood (2008) further explores ways in which
the Decentralization Theorem may break down under majority voting or lobbying even
when federal policy is, by assumption, prevented from reecting regional preferences.
3 A General Model of Governance Uncertainty
The starting point of our analysis is an innite horizon model of repeated elections and
performance voting, familiar from Ferejohn (1986), Persson et al. (1997), Coate and Morris
(1999) and Aidt and Magris (2006) among others. We extend the standard formulation of
the model by introducing voter heterogeneity and governance uncertainty.
Society consists of two groups of voters, i = 1; 2; politicians are indexed by 0. A group
is dened as a subset of voters who are a¤ected in the same way by public policy. Group
a¢ liation may be determined by observable characteristics such as age or gender, or by
shared preferences for public policy. In the context of scal federalism, group a¢ liation
is naturally dened along geographical lines and so we can think of the two groups as
representing two regions within a federation. Per-period utility, uit, is discounted with the
common discount factor  2 (0; 1) and lifetime welfare is given by
V0i =
1X
t=0
tuit; i 2 f0; 1; 2g: (1)
There are n1 voters in group 1 and n2 voters in group 2. We assume that n1  n2. The
size of the total (voter) population is n = n1 + n2.
Each period, the politician collects taxes up to a maximum of T , spends some of this
on providing amenities to his electorate, and keeps the rest for himself.6 Denoting the
cost of providing utilities to the two groups of voters by ct, we can write the politicians
6This formulation of the conict of interest between voters and politicians is due to Persson et al.
(1997) and used extensively in Persson and Tabellini (2000). It should be understood as a metaphor for
the more general phenomenon that politicians can divert their e¤orts towards activities that are not in
the interests of their electorate.
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per-period payo¤ as
u0t = T   ct (2)
if in o¢ ce, and u0t = 0 otherwise.
The cost of providing utility to voters is determined by the political cost function. We
dene C(x1t; x2t) as the minimum cost to the politician of providing utility levels u1t  x1t
and u2t  x2t simultaneously to voters in the two groups at time t. Likewise, we dene
Ci(xit) as the minimum cost of providing the utility level uit  xit to group i, i = 1; 2,
in isolation. We begin by specifying the political cost function directly, but shall derive it
from more fundamental considerations in the application to scal federalism that follows.
We make the following assumptions.
Assumption 1 The political cost functions are monotonically increasing in each argu-
ment, i.e.,
(M)
xt > x
0
t ) C(xt)  C(x0t)
xit > x
0
it ) Ci(xit)  Ci(x0it)
where xt = (x1t;x2t). Further, limxi!1C(x1; x2) = limxi!1Ci(xit) =1.
Assumption 2 The political cost functions are continuous, i.e.,
(K)
C(x1t;x2t) 2 C1
Ci(xit) 2 C1
:
The rst assumption says that it is costly for the politician to generate utility for each
group of voters. This is clearly the case whenever tax resources that could otherwise have
been extracted as rents have to be devoted to the task. However, when the politician
can generate utilities by providing public goods, the cost functions may not be strictly
increasing. The second assumption rules out discontinuities in the cost of generating
utilities. Both of these assumptions can be relaxed.
The property of the political cost function that really matters for outcomes is whether
it is sub- or super-additive. The political cost function is sub-additive if
(C+) C(x1t; x2t)  C1(x1t) + C2(x2t) (3)
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and super-additive if
(C ) C(x1t; x2t) > C1(x1t) + C2(x2t): (4)
A sub-additive political cost function makes it cheaper to provide utility to all voters jointly
than to provide the same utility levels to the two groups separately. In public nance, sub-
additivity is, typically, associated with pure public goods or positive externalities. A super-
additive cost function makes it more expensive to please all groups of voters jointly than
to please them separately. Super-additivity is caused by negative externalities associated
with, for example, provision of local public goods, pollution, or with envy e¤ects.
The politician, elected at t, cannot make binding promises on the level and pattern
of public spending before he enters o¢ ce. Since his own payo¤ decreases with ct, he
would, in the absence of further incentives, choose ct = 0 and provide no amenities to the
electorate. Voters know this, and threaten to vote retrospectively against a politician who
does not provide them with a minimum level of utility. At the beginning of each period,
voters in each group announce simultaneously a performance standard, denoted x1t and
x2t. They then vote in favor of reelection of the incumbent politician if, and only if the
policy implementation observed at the end of the period generates at least that level of
utility, i.e., if, and only if uit  xit.
The key feature of the model is that politicians are exposed to governance uncertainty.
At the most general level this means that the incumbent cannot be sure ex ante which of
the two groups is decisive in determining his reappointment. Governance uncertainty can
arise for many di¤erent reasons. A leading example is electoral turnout uncertainty, and
this is the interpretation we shall follow here for concreteness. In particular, we generate
governance uncertainty by assuming that neither group can guarantee to turn out in full
force at elections. Consequently, a politician may deliver on the performance standard set
by group 1, who, say, holds the majority ex ante, by incurring the cost C1(x1t), but fail to
deliver on the standard set by group 2 (u2t < x2t). On the day of the election, ~nit voters
from group i actually show up to vote, and the politician can lose his bid for reelection if
~n2t > ~n1t. The central assumption of our analysis is that electoral turnout is uncertain,
and that individual voters vote according to the announced performance standards if they
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show up to vote, but that they cannot, as a group, guarantee a particular turnout rate.
This is captured by the next assumption.
Assumption 3 Electoral turnout, ~nt = (~n1t; ~n2t), is random. The ex ante probability
that the turnout of group 1 is greater than that of group 2, P (~n1t  ~n2t), is equal to p1
and constant over time. The complementary probability is p2 = 1   p1. We assume that
p1 2 (0; 1).
Here, we specify the parameters p1 and p2 directly. Thye can be derived frommore basic
considerations, however, and di¤erent distributions of turnout shocks map into alternative
specications of p1 and p2. It is important that 0 < p1 < 1, so that neither group can
guarantee reelection. This is more likely to be the case when turnout shocks are correlated
within groups and and when di¤erences in group sizes are not too large. An example of
this is weather shocks. These are typically uncorrelated across space and can a¤ect the
turnout rate in particular geographical locations or keep certain types of voters, such as
the poor, at home (Roemer, 1998).
It is important to stress that governance uncertainty can arise for many other reasons
than turnout uncertainty in elections. It may, for example, reect uctuations in inter-
group power relations with one group becoming more powerful and therefore more pivotal
than another due to unpredictable events. The lobbying power of social groups may well
uctuate in this way. Under this interpretation, the probability of being pivotal, pi, can
be seen as a manifestation of randomness in the cost of political mobilization. Combined
with the insights from Olson (1965), a minority could be as likely as a majority group to
be pivotal, not because it may in fact hold the majority among those who turn out to
vote, but because it is better at organizing an e¤ective lobby group. Another example is
random preferences. Suppose that some people like education spending while others want
spending on care for the elderly and that the proportions of individuals of these two types
uctuate in unpredictable ways. In this case, pi represents the probability that one of the
"preference types" is pivotal.
The game between the incumbent politician and the two groups of voters unfolds
over time as follows. At the beginning of each period, voters in each group announce the
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(utility) standard that the politician needs to satisfy to get their votes in the next election.
The standards are chosen by the two groups non-cooperatively and at the same time.
The politician observes the standards and determines whether to comply, and if so, how
many standards to meet. We denote the set of actions available to the politician by A =
f(00); (10); (01); (11)g with elements at = (00) (meet neither standard); at = (10) (meet
group 1s standard only); at = (01) (meet group 2s standard only); and at = (11) (meet
both standards). At the end of the period, a new election is held and voters randomly turn
up to vote. Those who turn up vote according to the announced performance standard.
The politician either wins or loses. In the latter case, he is replaced by an identical
challenger; in the former case, -he gets (at least) another term in o¢ ce. After the election,
the game continues to the next period where a similar sequence of events takes place. We
restrict attention to history-independent subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this game.7 In
addition, we assume that the politician, if indi¤erent between two or more actions (which
are then preferred to the remaining ones), chooses the action that maximizes reelection
chances. Below, when we refer to equilibrium this is what we have in mind.
4 Equilibrium Paths
We can apply Theorem 1 from Aidt and Dutta (2004) to characterize the set of equilibria.
The theorem, which we formally state and prove in Appendix I, says that all equilibrium
paths of the political game described above have a property called strategic consensus: the
politician prefers to meet all performance standards at all times, all those voters who turn
out to vote in the election vote for the incumbent, and the incumbent is reelected with
certainty, irrespective of turnout shocks. While this outcome, perhaps, is to be expected
when the political cost function is sub-additive and it is cheaper for the politician to satisfy
7Formally, the model describes a dynamic common agency game with absorbing states and perfect
information. The two groups of voters are principals, and the elected politician their common agent.
Uncertainty in rewards arises from uncertainty about which of the two principals will have the casting
vote, or nal say, in the only reward available: re-election. There is no aggregate uncertainty, as one of
the principals will have the casting vote for sure.
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the standards jointly than separately, it is surprising that the same result obtains with
super-additive costs. In this case, the fact that it ismore expensive to satisfy the standards
jointly than separately suggests that partisan outcomes would be more likely. This
intuition is, however, wrong. To see why, consider the special case where the only policy
instrument is a group-specic transfer. This makes the political cost function additive.
To please voters, the politician must either be partisan and give transfers to one group
only or seek consensus and give to both. The two groups of voters set their standards
simultaneously. Suppose that group 1 announces a standard that is so high that the
politician prefers to take his chances and o¤er transfers only to group 2. This cannot be
an equilibrium. This is because group 1 gets nothing and it would do better by reducing its
standard to a level such that it is in the best interest of the politician to o¤er it a transfer.
In other words, whenever the politician is willing to implement a "partisan" outcome,
the disfavored group has an incentive to lower its standard to induce the politician to
make a "partisan" choice in its favor. This logic continues until the standards are such
that the politician is just willing to implement a policy that satises both groups. The
result is strategic consensus. Importantly, it does not follow from this logic that the two
groups will "under-bid" each other until the politician captures the entire rent. This would
only happen if the two groups were "perfect substitutes" in the sense that either of them
can guarantee reelection for sure (see Ferejohn, 1986). In our model, however, the two
groups of voters avoid Bertrand-style competition precisely because they are not "perfect
substitutes" from the point of view of the politician: the consent of both is needed to
secure the reelection reward with certainty. As a consequence, voters retain some control
power, even when political costs are additive. A similar logic applies when the political
cost function is either sub- or super-additive.
Although all equilibrium paths display strategic consensus, the distribution of payo¤s
depends critically on the properties of the political cost function. Let X = fx1t; x2tg1t=0
be a sequence of equilibrium performance standards. In an economy with sub-additive
political costs, the following characterization result holds. We provide a formal proof in
Appendix I.
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Proposition 1 (Sub-additive Costs) If the political cost functions satisfy assumptions
[M ] and [K] and are sub-additive, then X must satisfy
(SC+1 ) C(x1t; x2t) = T ;
(SC+2 ) C1(x1t)  p1T ;
(SC+3 ) C2(x2t)  p2T:
Moreover, (SC+2 ) and (SC
+
3 ) hold with equality for additive political cost functions. Along
all equilibrium paths, the politician receives payo¤s (1  )T per period.
The proposition explores the fact that the politician must, at equilibrium, be indi¤erent
between satisfying both and satisfying none of the standards. As a consequence, the
politician always gets per period payo¤ (1 )T , while the remaining share of tax revenues,
T , is devoted to the task of generating utilities to voters. Importantly, this distribution
of resources is una¤ected by turnout uncertainty. Thus, strategic consensus provides the
politician with full insuranceagainst random voter turnout and voters with insurance
against partisanchoices by the politician. When the political cost function is additive,
the allocation of utility between the two groups of voters is uniquely determined by p1
and p2. In contrast, economies with strictly sub-additive costs exhibit multiple equilibria
in performance standards at each t, and any equilibrium allocation what arises with sub-
additive costs (weakly) Pareto dominates the utility allocation with additive costs.
In an economy with super-additive political costs, the utility allocation is very di¤erent,
as shown by the second characterization result (see Appendix I for a proof).
Proposition 2 (Super-additive Costs) If the political cost functions satisfy assump-
tions [M ] and [K] and are super-additive, then X must satisfy
(SC 1 ) C(x1; x2)(1 + 1)  C1(x1) = 1T
(SC 2 ) C(x1; x2)(1 + 2)  C2(x2) = 2T
where i =
(1 pi)
1  for i = 1; 2. The politician receives payo¤s T   C(x1; x2) > (1   )T
every period. Moreover, if the cost functions are di¤erentiable and @C
@x1@x2
> 0, then the
solution to (SC 1 ) and (SC
 
2 ) is unique.
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In this case, the politician must, at equilibrium, be indi¤erent between satisfying both
standards and satisfying just one of them. The politician receives T   C(x1; x2) each
period. This is more that he receives along any equilibrium path with sub-additive costs,
but the payo¤ is no longer independent of turnout shocks. Intuitively, super-additive costs
make it costly for the politician to implement consensus outcomes. This enables him to
extract more rents: the two groups of voters have, ceteris paribus, to lower their standards
to prevent partisanoutcomes.
In the next section, we tailor the general model to the case of scal federalism. We
identify the two groups of voters with voters living in di¤erent regions of a country and
argue that governance uncertainty generated by turnout shocks is more pronounced at the
federal than at the regional level.
5 Fiscal Federalism
We consider a country with two regions, i = 1; 2. This corresponds to the two groups in
the general model. The two regions can be of di¤erent sizes, with ni voters living in region
i. We suppose that n1  n2. The regions may also di¤er with regard to tax potential
and electoral turnout patterns. Individuals in each region derive utility from local public
goods git and private goods yit. Consumption of local public goods in one region generates
externalities for individuals in the other region. To capture this, we write the utility
function of a typical individual living in region i as
uit = yit + git   g it (5)
where  2 ( 1; n2
n1
) captures the strength of the externality.  > 0 corresponds to a
negative and  < 0 to a positive externality. Public goods are produced by the following
technology
git =
1

kit (6)
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where kit is an input required to produce the public good, bought at a constant price of
one. For simplicity, we assume that  = 1
2
.8 The maximum revenue that can be raised
each period in region i is Ti, and so the maximum revenue that can be raised in the country
is T = T1 + T2. We use the convention that politicians raise the maximum revenue each
period, spent some of it on providing local public goods, some on transfers sit > 0 to
individuals, and keep the rest as rents.
We compare two institutional arrangements: Regionalism [R] and federalism [F ]. Re-
gionalism means that each region elects its own politician who can nance local public
goods (and transfers) out of local tax revenues. Federalism means that a single elected
politician is in charge of the whole country and can use general tax revenues to provide
public goods and transfers to the two regions.9
The key assumption of the model is that turnout uncertainty is more pronounced at
the federal than at the regional level. This assumption can be justied in many ways.
Most importantly, the federal politician must, by denition, cater to more principals than
each of the regional politicians. In particular, the federal politician needs the support
of the majority of the whole country while a regional politician only needs the majority
support of his own region. Turnout shocks at the regional level renders regional turnout
unpredictable. Consequently, the federal politician faces an additional layer of uncertainty
that is not present in regional elections. To make the contrast as sharp as possible, we
assume that regional politicians can guarantee reelection if they satisfy the performance
standard set by voters in their region: there is no turnout uncertainty within a region. In
contrast to the two regional politicians, the politician in charge of the federation is exposed
to turnout uncertainty and needs the support of voters in both regions to get reelected for
sure. We denote the ex ante probability that voters in region i holds the majority among
those who turn out to vote by pi with p1 = 1   p2. Again, it is important to stress that
turnout uncertainty is not the only valid interpretation of pi. For example, pi can also be
8This assumption can be relaxed, but doing so yields no additional insights and complicates the math-
ematical exposition.
9This formulation rules out cooperation among regions in regime [R]. In some cases, this could be
important, although high transaction costs typically rule such cooperation out in practice.
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interpreted as a power index that captures the inuence of region i in federal decisions.
All regions may be pivotal occasionally because of random shifts in power relations, but
some regimes are more likely to be pivotal than others.
5.1 The Benevolent Planners Solution
As a benchmark, suppose that all public nance decisions were made by benevolent plan-
ners. When scal decisions are decentralized to the regional level, two regional planners
decide independently and simultaneously how much local public good to provide to their
region. They do so by maximizing regional aggregate public goods surplus taken the
spending decision in the other region as given:
sDit (kit; k it) = 2(k
1
2
it   k
1
2
 it)  kit, i = 1; 2: (7)
In a federation, on the other hand, decisions are made by one benevolent planner who max-
imizes aggregate public goods surplus for the whole country, i.e., sFt (k1t; k2t) =
P
sDit (:).
It is easy to verify that federalism under these ideal circumstances Pareto denominates
regionalism for all  6= 0.10 The intuition is straight forward. Rent seeking is not an
issue with benevolent planners, so the level of centralization does not create or eliminate
political distortions. Moreover, federal and regional planners are equality good at catering
to local tastes. Hence, the only concern is to internalize externalities. This provides a
clear-cut benchmark against which we can measure political distortions.
5.2 The Political Cost Functions
To characterize equilibrium allocations, we need to derive the political cost functions. This
is done in Appendix II. In the following, we focus on the situation in which both federal
and regional politicians provide local public goods and transfers at equilibrium. This
basically requires that tax resources are su¢ ciently large in each region and in the federal
10For  = 0, the institutional arrangement makes no di¤erence.
16
as a whole.11
Under regionalism, the two regional politicians face a separate performance standard.
They make decisions about public spending without (direct) regard for the welfare of voters
in the other region, i.e., each politician takes the spending decisions by the other politician
as given. Consider the politician in region i who in period t faces the performance standard
xit. The minimum cost of satisfying this standard for a given input to the production of
local public goods in the other region is
C(xit; k i) = min
kit0;sit0
kit + nisit (8)
subject to xit  sit + 2k
1
2
it   2k
1
2
 it and the regional budget constraint. It follows that
kit = (ni)
2 and sit = xit   2(ni   n i). The political cost functions are
CRi (xit) = (ni)
2 + ni(xit   2(ni   n i)) for i = 1; 2: (9)
We notice that the externality is not internalized: both regions spend on local public goods
up to the point where the regional marginal benet is equal to the marginal cost. The
transfer must, therefore, "compensate" regional voters for the impact of spending on local
public goods in the other region. In each region, voters set the performance standard in
period t taking the standard of the other region as given. At equilibrium, the standards are
set to make each regional politician indi¤erent between satisfying the standard and getting
reelected (for sure) and not satisfying it, in case of which he is replaced but keeps all local
tax revenues Ti for himself. This yields the following stationary equilibrium allocation:
xRit =
Ti
ni
  ni + 2(ni   n i) for i = 1; 2: (10)
11Necessary conditions that guarantee that politicians, at equilibrium, provide local public goods and
transfers in all regimes are: Ti >
(ni)
2
 for i = 1; 2; for  < 0
T > max
i
ni
pi
 
4n i + ni
 
2 + 1

;
and for   0
T > max
i
"
n2i
 
1 + 2 (1 + pi)
  4n1n2pi + n2 i2 (1  pi)
pi
#
:
See Appendix II for details.
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The politician of region i keeps a share (1 )Ti of regional tax revenues each period, and
uses the rest to provide local public goods and transfers to voters of his region. A negative
externality reduces voterswelfare ( > 0), while a positive externality ( < 0) enhances
their well-being, as one would expect.
Under federalism, decision making power rests with a single elected politician who
faces the performance standards fx1t; x2tg set by voters in the two regions each period.
The politician minimizes the cost of satisfying the two standards jointly by spending kit =
(ni   n i)2 on local public goods and by providing transfers sit = xit 2ni (1 + 2)+4n i
to voters in each of the two regions. The political cost function is therefore given by
CF (x1t; x2t) = (n1   n2)2 + (n2   n1)2 (11)
+n1
 
x1t   2n1
 
1 + 2

+ 4n2

+n2
 
x2t   2n2
 
1 + 2

+ 4n1

If the politician decides to satisfy the standard of one of the regions, say, region i, only, then
it is clear that s it = 0. However, if local public goods generate a positive externality, it is
cost e¤ective to provide some local public goods to region  i: not because the politician
cares about the welfare of voters in that region as such, but because it is, up to a point,
cheaper to provide utility to voters in region i this way than to give them transfers. Hence,
for  < 0, the cost minimizing choice of spending on local public goods is kit = (ni)
2 and
k it = (ni)
2 and the transfer to each voter of group i is xit  2ni(1+ 2). If, on the other
hand, local public goods generate negative externalities, then k it = 0 minimizes political
costs and the politician spends kit = (ni)
2 on local public goods to region i and provides
the voters of that region with the transfer sit = xit   2ni. With this in mind, we can for
i = 1; 2 write the political cost functions as follows
CFi (xit) = (ni)
2 + ni(xit   2ni) for   0 (12)
CFi (xit) =
 
1 + 2

(ni)
2 + ni(xit   2ni(1 + 2)) for  < 0: (13)
We notice that for  < 0
CF (x1t; x2t) 
X
i
CFi (xit) = 4n2n1 < 0; (14)
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and for   0,
CF (x1t; x2t) 
X
i
CFi (xit) = 
 
4n1n2   (n21 + n22

) > 0: (15)
The political cost function is sub-additive for  < 0 and additive for  = 0. For  > 0, the
cost function is super-additive for all  2

0; n2
n1

as (3n21   n22) n2n1 > 0 for n1  n2.
Below we apply propositions 1 and 2 to characterize stationary equilibrium allocations.
Our main goal is to compare regime [F] and [R] under di¤erent assumptions about the
magnitude of the externality. We use Pareto e¢ ciency as our welfare criterion. In doing
so, we adopt a citizens-centric approach and exclude the rents captured by the politicians.
That is, we say that regime [F] Pareto dominates [R] if all voters prefer [F] to [R]. This
approach has several advantages. Firstly, Besley and Coate (2003) propose to use aggre-
gate public goods surplus to evaluate the costs and benets of centralization. We prefer
the Pareto criterion because it, in contrast to a criterion based on aggregate public goods
surplus, has a clear-cut positive implication: if one institutional arrangement Pareto dom-
inates another, all voters would support a change in the institutional arrangement if the
decision to change was put to a vote in, e.g., a referendum (as in Crémer and Palfrey
(1996)). Secondly, the citizens-centric approach has the advantage that the comparisons
are not distorted by whether politicians can extract more or less rents. Since the rents are
pure social waste in our model, this seems a reasonable choice from a normative point of
view. However, from a positive point of view, it is interesting also to study how regional
politicians, who may have a disproportionate say in whether centralization takes place or
not, rank the di¤erent regimes, and we do so in section 6.
5.3 No Externality
To set the stage, we begin by considering the case in which there is no externality. In
this case, political costs are additive and the total rent ((1  )T ) captured by the federal
politician corresponds precisely to the sum of those captured by the two regional politicians
((1  )T1+(1  )T2). An implication, then, is that the only e¤ect of centralization is to
allow redistribution between the two regions: with additive costs, centralization is a zero-
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sum game and if one region gains it must be at the expense of the other. Consequently,
the two regimes cannot be Pareto ranked.
Proposition 3 (No externality  = 0) Regime [F] and [R] cannot be Pareto ranked.
Region i prefers regime [F] to [R] if, and only if
pi >
Ti
T
for i = 1; 2:
Proof. Using proposition 1, we can derive the equilibrium utility allocation in regime
[F] as follows
xFit =
piT
ni
+ ni for i = 1; 2:
The utility di¤erences between regime [F] and [R] is
xFit   xRit = n 1i  (Tpi   Ti) = n 1i (piT i   p iTi)  bi for i = 1; 2: (16)
where xRit is dened by equation (10). The proposition follows immediately from the fact
that b1 > 0, b2 < 0
Individuals in region i receives piT
ni
+ ni from the federal government and
Ti
ni
+ ni
from the regional government. Intuitively, therefore, whether a region gains or loses from
centralization depends on pi the probability that each region holds the majority among
those who turn out to vote in the federal election relative to the regions contribution
to federal tax revenues. An implication, then, is that poor regions are, ceteris paribus,
more likely to favor centralization than rich regions. For given tax resources, the size of
the region as such does not matter for the costs and benets of centralization. However,
if the tax resources are, say, proportional to the population size of a region, i.e., Ti = niIi
where Ii is per capita income of region i, then size becomes a consideration. Supposing,
for example, that Ii = I i and pi = p i, then region i benets from federal redistribution
if and only if it is smaller than region  i. In other words, in the absence of externalities,
centralization tends to be favored by small and poor regions and/or by regions that are
likely to be pivotal in federal decision making.
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5.4 Negative Externalities
The situation is more complex and interesting when local public goods generate a negative
externality ( > 0) and political costs become super-additive. In this case, centralization
is associated with three e¤ects. The rst e¤ect is the redistribution e¤ect described above:
centralization pools revenues from the two regions and thus allows redistribution to take
place. The second e¤ect is the internalization e¤ect : centralization induces the federal
politician to internalize the externality in order to minimize the cost of getting reelected.
This benets all voters. The third e¤ect is the rent e¤ect. The rent e¤ect arises because
political costs are super-additive. Recall from proposition 2 that the federal politicians
share of total revenues, at equilibrium, is larger than (1   )T . This implies that less is
available in total to generate amenities to voters in the federation than in the two regions
separately. This harms all voters. In the next proposition, we isolate the externality and
rent e¤ect from the redistribution e¤ect by assuming that p1 = 12 and that T1 = T2.
Proposition 4 (Negative Externalities  > 0) Let  = n1
n2
 1. Assume that p1 = 12
and T1 = T2. Then for  >
(1+)( 1)
2(32 1)
1. [R] is Pareto superior to [F] for  2 (0; 4(1 )
(2 )(1+2)).
2. [F] is Pareto superior to [R] for  2 ( 4(1 )
(2 )(1+2) ; 
 1):
Proof. Using proposition 2 and equations (11) and (12), we can derive the (unique)
stationary utility allocation as follows:
xFit =
piT + n
2
i +  (1  pi)
 
n2 i   4nin i + n2i

ni
for i = 1; 2:
The utility di¤erences between regime [F] and [R] are
it = x
F
it   xFit = bi +    (1  pi) (n2i + n2 i)  2nin i(1  2pi)ni for i = 1; 2;
where bi is dened in equation (16). For p1 = 12 and T1 = T2, we have that
it =

 

 
1  1
2


(n2i + n
2
 i)  2nin i(1  )

ni
.
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We note thatit  0,  it  0. In particular, it < 0 for i = 1; 2 for  2 (0; 4(1 )(2 )(1+2))
and (weakly) positive for  2 [ 4(1 )
(2 )(1+2) ; 
 1)where  = n1
n2
. Notice that 4(1 )
(2 )(1+2) < 
 1
,  > (1+)( 1)
2(32 1)
The proposition shows that centralization is e¢ cient only with strong negative external-
ities. This is in contrast to the social planners solution which showed that centralization
is a Pareto improvement for all  > 0. The result, however, echoes the classical nding by
Oates (1972), although the logic is entirely di¤erent. While Oates focused on the trade o¤
between internalizing externalities and catering for di¤erences in the preference for pub-
lic goods in di¤erent regions, the trade o¤ behind proposition 4 has nothing to do with
heterogenous taste: it is driven by the rent e¤ect. Centralization implies a transfer of re-
sources from voters in the two regions to the federal politician. For weak externalities, both
regions are, for that reason, worse o¤ in a federation. However, for  > 4(1 )
(2 )(1+2) , the
externality e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong to dominate the rent e¤ect, and federalism Pareto
dominates regionalism. It is interesting to notice that this threshold is decreasing in .
This means that two unequally sized regions are more likely to benet from joining a
federation than two equal-sized regions. The reason is that it is relatively expensive for
a regional politician to compensate his voters through transfers for any un-internalized
externalities when the two regions are of unequal size.
Proposition 4 ignores the redistribution e¤ect which, as we noted above, is driven by
turnout uncertainty as captured by pi and di¤erences in tax resources in the two regions.
Taking this e¤ect into account, we can dene the values of p1 for which the two regions
are indi¤erent between the two regimes as:
p11(; ) =
T2 +  (2n1n2   (n21 + n22))
 (T2 (1 + ) + (4n1n2   (n21 + n22)) )
; (17)
p21(; ) =
T2 + 
2(1  )(n21 + n22)  2(1  2)n1n2
 (T2 (1 + ) + (4n1n2   (n21 + n22)) )
; (18)
where  = T1
T2
. Region 1 prefers regime [F] to [R] if, and only if p1 > p11(; ) and region
2 prefers regime [F] to [R] if, and only if p1 < p21(; ). The two functions, p
1
1(; ) and
p21(; ), are drawn in Figure 1 in (; p1) space for a given value of . We can identify
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Figure 1: Welfare analysis with super-additive political costs.
two main areas: in area 1 regime [R] is Pareto superior to [F], while in area 2, regime [F]
Pareto dominates [R]. Outside these areas, the distribution e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong to
make one of the regions better o¤ at the expense of the other. An increase in  (which
makes region 1 relatively richer) shifts p11(; ) and p
2
1(; ) up making it less likely that
region 1 and more likely that region 2 benets from federalism.
5.5 Positive Externalities
The situation in which local public goods generate positive externalities is very di¤erent.
In this case, political costs are sub-additive and proposition 1 shows that there exists
multiple equilibria under federalism. Along all equilibrium paths, the aggregate utility of
the two regions is, however, uniquely determined by
n1x1t + n2x2t = T +
  
n21 + n
2
2
  
1 + 2
  4n1n2 : (19)
Moreover, the lower bounds on the utility provided to each region is given by xi 
1
ni
(piT + n
2
i (1 + 
2)) for i = 1; 2. The federal politician collects the rent (1   )T
each period. This is the same as the total rent collected by the two regional politicians:
there is no rent e¤ect with sub-additive costs. In the absence, then, of signicant redis-
tribution e¤ects (i.e., for p1 = 12 , T1 = T2), one might expect that centralization is always
a Pareto improvement. The next proposition shows that this is not the case. To state
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the result, we denote the share of total utility that goes to region 1 by '. This allows
us to index equilibrium allocations by '. We also, for simplicity and without loss of any
important insights, assume that n1 = n2 = 1. This this case ' = x1tT+2(1 )2 .
Proposition 5 (Positive externalities  < 0) Assume that p1 = 12 , T1 = T2 and n1 =
n2 = 1. Then there exists a ' 2 (0; 12) such that for ' 2 ['; 1   '] regime [F] Pareto
dominates regime [R].
Proof. Using proposition 1, we can calculate the bestand the worstequilibrium
allocation for each region under regime [F]:
xmaxit = piT + 1 + 
2   4
xminit = piT + 1 + 
2
for i = 1; 2. Region i is better o¤ under [R] than under [F] in the worstequilibrium if
xminit   xDit = bi + 2 + 2 < 0;
and is better o¤ under [F] than under [R] in the bestequilibrium if
xmaxit   xDit = bi + 2   2 > 0;
where bi is dened in equation (16). For p1 = 12 and T1 = T2, we see that xminit   xDit < 0
and xmaxit   xDit > 0 for i = 1; 2. Thus, at least one region prefers [F] to [R]. Along any
equilibrium path
x1t + x2t = T + 2(1  )2:
Dene the share of total utility obtained by region i by 'i. Region i is then indi¤erent
between the two regimes for
'i =
Ti + 1  2
T + 2(1  )2  'i:
Note that for T1 = T2, 0 < '1 < 1   '2 < 1 and that '1 = '2 < 12 . Since
P
i 'i = 1, we
conclude that for '1 2 ('1; 1  '2) both regions prefer [F] to [R]. Substitution of '1 = '
and '1 = ' yields the proposition
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Corollary 1 For p1 = 12 , T1 = T2, n1 = n2 = 1 and  < 0, there exist equilibrium
allocations for which centralization is not a Pareto improvement.
The proposition shows that federalism Pareto dominates regionalism in some, but not
all, equilibria. In the absence of the rent and redistribution e¤ect, it is surprising that cen-
tralization is not always e¢ cient. Why is it not better for all voters to allow internalization
of the external benets? The reason is that the selection of equilibria, in fact, re-opens
the door to redistribution, but now redistribution is driven by the selection of equilibria,
rather than by di¤erences in pi and Ti as such. For example, in the worstequilibrium
under regime [F], the external benet captured by region 1 is 2 which is less that what it
receivesunder [R], namely  2. The point is that in this equilibrium most of the bene-
ts from having the positive externality internalized are captured by region 2 and region 1
is better o¤ with the externalbenets unintentionally bestowed on it by region 2 under
regionalism. This and the proposition more generally is illustrated in Figure 2. The
Figure shows the utility allocations attainable in the federation under the assumptions of
the proposition. The segment A B indicated with bold on the utility frontier contains the
equilibrium allocations that Pareto dominate regionalism (represented by point R). The
remaining allocation on the frontier cannot be Pareto ranked. In these cases, contrary to
the Decentralization Theorem, it is not e¢ cient to centralize despite the fact that there are
no regional di¤erences in neither taste nor income, but there are (positive) externalities
to be internalized. An implication of this, then, is that regionalism cannot ever Pareto
dominate federalism with positive externalities. This stands in sharp contrast to the case
with negative externalities discussed above.
6 Fiscal Integration and Disintegration
Logically, scal integration among otherwise independent regions or countries must either
be fully voluntary or forced upon reluctant regions by more powerful neighbors. Voluntary
integration leads to a stable scal structure, while the end result of forced integration must
be considered unstable with a tendency to break down over time. Leading examples of
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Figure 2: Utility allocations with sub-additive political costs.
the former include Switzerland, where the independent Cantons in 1848 agreed to form
a federation, and the United States in the formative years. As an example of the latter
one may point to the United Kingdom. England has traditionally played the leading role
within the Union, but over the years her power has gradually been curtailed, rst, by
Ireland seceding in 1921, and more recently by the push to devolve power to Wales and
Scotland. Our analysis can speak directly to the forces that create and destroy federations.
In the absence of strong externalities, federations are simply vehicles for redistribution
and must be forced in one way or the other. Federal structures are, typically, supported
by small, relatively poor regions that stand gain from integration and opposed by rich
and populous regions that stand to lose. Of course, if the rich and populous regions are
su¢ ciently powerful (in the sense of being more likely to be pivotal in federal decision
making), this preference ordering may be reversed, but it remains that, in the absence
of externalities, federalism cannot be based on consensus. As a consequence, federations
born in this context are likely to be unstable with regions continuously trying to secede.
Voluntary formation of a federation, then, as in Oates (1972), requires strong external-
ities. Our analysis suggests that the logic leading to the formation of a stable federation
di¤ers signicantly depending on whether externalities are predominately negative or pos-
itive. With negative externalities, the strength of the externality is the key driver of
integration: a strong negative externality makes all regions favor a federation and accept
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the loss of accountability that comes with it. But heterogenous population sizes also play
a role. In fact, federations are more likely to form among regions of di¤erent sizes than
among equal-sized regions. Surprisingly, a strong positive externality is not su¢ cient to
make federalism the preferred organization structure of the scal state. The reason is that
turnout uncertainty opens up the door for redistribution through equilibrium selection
even among otherwise symmetric regions. Depending on the distributional outcome some
regions may lose out and veto integration even when externalities are strong or, if they are
already in the federation, attempt to secede.
We have so far taken a citizen-centric approach and ignored the interests of the regional
politicians when making regime comparisons. In practice, however, regional politicians
may have disproportionate inuence on integration decisions and be able to supersede
the interests of the voters they represent. To consider this possibility, suppose that the
scal architecture of the country is decided by consent of the two regional politicians
irrespective of what voters want and that each perceives that there is a probability qi,
with
P
i qi = 1, that he will become the "federal politician".
12 Given that, centralization
cannot be voluntary if the externality is (weakly) positive. The reason is that the total rent
that can be extracted by the federal politician is equal to the sum of the rents extracted
by the two regional politicians. As a consequence, one of them will lose, in expectation, by
agreeing to a federation. With negative externalities, the situation is very di¤erent. Recall
that the aggregate rent that can be extracted by the federal politician is greater than the
sum of the rents extracted by the two regional politicians. This implies that federalism
may be preferred to regionalism by all regional politicians. To see this, suppose that the
two regions are symmetric with pi = 12 , n1 = n2 = 1 and T1 = T2 =
1
2
T .13 In this case, the
rent collected by the federal politician is:
RF = (1  )T + 2 (1  ) (2  ) : (20)
The politician of region i prefers federalism to regionalism if qiRF > 12 (1  )T . Then,
12If they dont have any chance of becoming the federal politician, they will veto any attempt at
centralization since they will lose their rents.
13See Appendix III for details.
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for q1 such that
q1 > q1 > 1  q1 (21)
both politicians prefer [F] to [R] where
q1 =
1
2
(1  )T + 2 (1  ) (2  )
(1  )T + 2 (1  ) (2  ) >
1
2
: (22)
The threshold q1 is increasing in the strength of the externality. Hence, the two regional
politicians are most likely to consent to a federation if externalities are strong, not because
they have any interest in internalizing these externalities, but because they can extract
extra rents from voters in this case. Combined with proposition 4, this provides a very
strong positive prediction: in the presence of strong negative externalities, all voters and
all politicians support a federation.
7 Conclusion and Discussion
This paper revisits the classical question about whether scal decisions should be cen-
tralized or decentralized. We show how governance uncertainty exemplied by turnout
uncertainty a¤ects the trade o¤ between internalization of externalities and political ac-
countability. We highlight a novel asymmetry between positive and negative externalities
and show that centralization only weakens political accountability in the presence of nega-
tive externalities. We also show that in the presence of positive externalities centralization
may not be Pareto e¢ cient despite the fact that policy can be tailored to regional tastes
and centralization internalizes regional spillover e¤ects. These results, however, ignore a
potentially important benet of decentralization, namely yardstick competition. As shown
by Besley and Case (1995), voters can make comparisons between jurisdictions and use
information about what is happening in other jurisdictions to overcome political agency
problems. This forces incumbents into (yardstick) competition in which they care about
what other incumbents are doing. This benet is, of course, lost if scal decisions are
centralized. It would be interesting in future research to extent the analysis to include the
possibility of yardstick competition.
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More generally, the paper explores the consequences of turnout uncertainty in a polit-
ical agency model with repeated elections, retrospective voting, and heterogenous voters.
The general framework and the characterization results in Aidt and Dutta (2004) can be
adopted to many other applications than the one studied here. This includes other public
nance problems, e.g., the choice between targeted transfers and universal public goods
(see Aidt and Dutta (2010)), but applications in many other elds, including corporate
governance and labor economics, also come to mind.
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8 Appendix I
To prove the main characterization results, we must rst prove that all equilibria exhibits
strategic consensus. We begin by introducing some extra notation. Let x i(xi) be the
level of utility group  i obtains when the politician provides utility level xi to group i at
minimum cost without regard to the welfare of group  i. Then, the following is true:
[B1] C(x1t; x2t (x1t)) = C1 (x1t)
[B2] C(x1t (x2t) ; x1t) = C2 (x2t) :
A special case of this is when C(x1t; 0) = C1 (x1t) and C(0; x2t) = C2 (x2t) as assumed in
Aidt and Dutta (2004). We also assume that C(0; 0) = Ci(0) = 0; i = 1; 2. We can now
state the main Theorem.
Theorem 1 (Strategic Consensus) Assume that  2 (0; 1). Let xt = (x1t; x2t) be a
pair of performance standards set by the two groups of voters for period t and dene
X = fxtg1t=0 as a sequence of such standards. Let at be the action implemented by the
politician in period t; dene V0t(at) as the politicians payo¤.
1. A stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists.
2. Suppose (M), (K) and (C+) hold. Along any stationary equilibrium path, X satises
(SC+) V0t(11) = V0t(00)  maxfV0t(10); V0t(01)g:
Any sequence X satisfying (SC+) is a stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in
performance standards. Along any stationary equilibrium path, the politician chooses
at = (11) at every t and he is reelected for sure.
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3. Suppose (M), (K) and (C ) hold. Along any stationary equilibrium path, X satises
(SC ) V0t(11) = V0t(10) = V0t(01) > V0t(00):
Any sequence X satisfying (SC ) is a stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in
performance standards. Along any stationary equilibrium path, the politician chooses
at = (11) at every t and he is reelected for sure.
Corollary 2 Every stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium path displays strategic
consensus at each t.
We prove the Theorem with a series of Lemmas. We begin by introducing some nota-
tion. Denote for each action at 2 A, the politicians payo¤ by V0t(at) and write
V0t(00) = T ; (23)
V0t(10) = T   C1(x1t) + p1Vt+1; (24)
V0t(01) = T   C2(x2t) + p2Vt+1; (25)
V0t(11) = T   C(x1t; x2t) + Vt+1: (26)
where Vt+1 > 0 is the value of being reelected at time t + 1. Note that the politician is
only reelected with some probability (p1 or p2) if he chooses to be partisanand satisfy
one of the standards only.
Now, suppose, in some period t, that the two groups of voters announce the standards
xt = fx1t; x2tg. Given these standards, the politician chooses an action from the set
fat 2 A : argmaxat2A V0t(at)g. If the politician is indi¤erent between two or more actions
in this set, he chooses the action that maximizes reelection chances. This is anticipated by
the two groups of voters when they, simultaneously, set their standards at the beginning
of the period. With these preliminary remarks we can state the rst Lemma.
Lemma 1 Suppose that [M] and [K] hold. If the performance standards xt = fx1t; x2tg
constitute a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium at time t, then xt must satisfy
(E0) V0t(11)  maxfV0t(10); V0t(01); V0t(00)g:
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Proof: We argue by contradiction. Suppose that ext = fex1t; ex2tg constitutes a station-
ary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in performance standards and that
V0t(11) < maxfV0t(10); V0t(01); V0t(00)g
at time t. There are four separate cases to consider. We show in each case that at least
one of the two groups of voters has an incentive to deviate from ext, leading to the required
contradiction.
1. Suppose that
V0t(10) = maxfV0t(10); V0t(01); V0t(00)g > V0t(11)
or that
V0t(10) = V0t(00) = maxfV0t(10); V0t(01); V0t(00)g > V0t(11):
Rewrite (24) and (26) to get
V0t(10)  V0t(11) = C(x1t; x2t)  C1(x1t)  p2Vt+1:
By [M] and [K], property [B1] implies that there must exist a x02t > x2t such that
C(ex1t; x02t)  C1(ex1t)  p2Vt+1 < 0:
This implies that group 2 can gain by announcing the standard x02t instead of ex2t.
2. Suppose instead that
V0t(01) = maxfV0t(10); V0t(01); V0t(00)g > V0t(11)
or that
V0t(01) = V0t(00) = maxfV0t(10); V0t(01); V0t(00)g > V0t(11):
By an argument similar to the previous case, there must exist a x01t > x1t such that
C(x01t; ex2t)  C2(ex2t)  p1Vt+1 < 0:
This implies that group 1 can gain by announcing the standard x01t instead of ex1t.
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3. Suppose that
V0t(00) = maxfV0t(10); V0t(01); V0t(00)g > V0t(11):
Rewrite equations (23) and (24) to get
V0t(00)  V0t(10) = C(x1t; x2t)  p1Vt+1:
By [M] and [K] there must exist a x001t > 0 such that
C(x001t; x2t)  p1Vt+1 < 0:
This implies that group 1 can at least gain x001t > 0 by announcing the standard x
00
1t
instead of ex1t. A similar argument can be made for group 2.
4. Suppose that
V0t(10) = V0t(01) = maxfV0t(10); V0t(01); V0t(00)g > V0t(11)
or
V0t(10) = V0t(01) = V0t(00) > V0t(11):
We need to consider two sub-cases. First, suppose the politician chooses at = (10).
We can then repeat the argument from case 1 to show that there exists a deviation
for group 2. Second, suppose the politician chooses at = (01). We can then repeat
the argument from case 2 to show that there exists a deviation for group 1.
Lemma 2 A pair of performance standards xt = (x1t; x2t) is a stationary subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium at time t if, and only if
(E1) V0t(11) = maxfV0t(01); V0t(00)g;
(E2) V0t(11) = maxfV0t(10); V0t(00)g:
Proof: Suppose that p1  12 . The per-period payo¤ of group 1 is
u1t = x1t if maxfV0t(11); V0t(10)g  maxfV0t(01); V0t(00)g;
u1t = x1t otherwise:
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The per-period payo¤ of group 2 is
u2t = x2t if
8>>><>>>:
V0t(11)  maxfV0t(10); V0t(00); V0t(01)g
V0t(01) > maxfV0t(10); V0t(00); V0t(11)g
V0t(01) = V0t(00) > maxfV0t(10); V0t(11)g
;
u2t = x2t otherwise:
Recall that C(x1t; x2t) and Ci(xit) are monotonically increasing in their arguments by [M].
Suppose that ext is a (stationary subgame perfect Nash) equilibrium. Then, by Lemma 1,
(E0) is satised by ext. It follows that the payo¤ of group 1 is maximized by the standard,
x1t, that satises (E1), and that the payo¤ of group 2 is maximized by the standard,
x2t, that satises (E2). Finally, notice that if (E1) and (E2) are satised by a set of
performance standards at time t, then these standards constitute a stationary subgame
perfect Nash Equilibrium. This completes the proof for the case with p1  12 . The proof
for the case where p1 < 12 is similar and is omitted
The following two Lemmas explore the implications of assumptions (C+) and (C ),
respectively.
Lemma 3 Conditions (E1), (E2), and (C+) hold at t if, and only if
V0t(11) = V0t(00)  maxfV0t(10); V0t(01)g:
Proof: Note that (C+) implies that
(C0+) V0t(11) + V0t(00)  V0t(10) + V0t(01)
at any t. We prove the Lemma by contradiction. Suppose V0t(11) > V0t(00). Condition
(E2) implies that
V0t(11) = V0t(10):
Substitute into (C0+) to get that
V0t(00)  V0t(01):
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Combing this with (E1) yields
V0t(11)  V0t(00):
This is a contradiction, so V0t(11) cannot be greater than V0t(00). It follows directly from
(E1) that V0t(11) cannot be smaller than V0t(00). Finally, V0t(11) = V0t(00) is compatible
with (C0+), (E1), and (E2) only if V0t(10)  V0t(00) and V0t(01)  V0t(00)
The next Lemma considers the case of super-additive costs.
Lemma 4 Conditions (E1), (E2), and (C ) hold at t if, and only if
V0t(11) = V0t(10) = V0t(01) > V0t(00):
Proof: Note that (C ) implies that
(C0 ) V0t(11) + V0t(00) < V0t(10) + V0t(01)
at any t. We begin by proving that V0t(11) = V0t(10). This is done by contradiction. First,
suppose that V0t(11) > V0t(10). (E2) implies that
V0t(00) > V0t(10):
Combining this with (C0 ) implies that
V0t(11) < V0t(01):
However, (E1) implies that V0t(11)  V0t(01). This is a contradiction, so V0t(11) cannot
be greater than V0t(10). Second, suppose that V0t(10) > V0t(11). (E2) implies that
V0t(11)  V0t(10);
This is a contradiction, and so V0t(10) cannot be greater than V0t(11). We conclude
that V0t(10) = V0t(11). The proof that V0t(01) = V0t(11) is similar and omitted. Finally,
V0t(11) = V0t(10) = V0t(01) is compatible with (C0 ) only if V0t(11) = V0t(10) = V0t(01) >
V0t(00)
The last Lemma establishes that a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium exists.
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Lemma 5 A stationary subgame perfect equilibrium exists for  2 (0; 1).
Proof: Suppose rst that (C+) holds. In this case, a stationary equilibrium x^ =
fx^1; x^2g satises (SC+) at every t. This implies
T   C(x^1; x^2)
1   = T ; (27)
and that
T  max[T   C1(x^1)
(1  p1) ;
T   C2(x^2)
(1  p2) ]:
Equation (27) rewrites as
C(x^1; x^2) = T:
Equilibrium levels of x^ satisfy
C(x^1; x^2) = T (28)
and
T  min[C1(x^1)
p1
;
C2(x^2)
p2
]: (29)
It follows from conditions (C+), (M) and (K) that there exists a solution to equations
(28) and (29).
Suppose instead that (C ) holds. In this case, a stationary equilibrium x = fx1; x2g
must satisfy
T   C(x1; x2)
1   =
T   C1(x1)
1  p1 (30)
and
T   C(x1; x2)
1   =
T   C2(x2)
1  p2 (31)
along with
T   C(x1; x2)
1   > T: (32)
Dene the quantities x11; x12; x21; x22 as solutions to equations (30) and (31) when x1 = x1
and x2 = x2 respectively. Then,
T   C(x11; x2)
1   =
T   C(x11; x2)
1  p1 ;
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T   C(x1; x21)
1   =
T
1  p1
T   C(x12; x2)
1   =
T
1  p2
T   C(x1; x22)
1   =
T   C(x1; x22)
1  p2 :
Solving these equations yields
T = C(x11; x2) = C(x1; x22);
in addition,
x12  x11;
and
x21  x22
whenever  2 (0; 1). It follows that a solution to equations (30) and (31) exists.
Additionally, if x satises equations (30) and (31) then restriction (32) holds for all
 2 (0; 1). To show that an equilibrium exists for all  2 (0; 1), rewrite (30) and (31) as
T = (1 + )C(x1; x2)  C(x1; x2);
T = (1 + )C(x1; x2)  C(x1; x2);
where  = p2
1  and  =
p1
1  . Adding the two equations, we obtain
( + )(T   C(x1; x2))  C(x1; x2) = C(x1; x2)  C(x1; x2)  C(x1; x2) > 0 (33)
by [C-]. Note also that  +  = 
1  and that (33) implies
C(x1; x2) < T
as assumed
Based on this fundamental result, it is relatively straight forward to prove propositions
1 and 2.
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Proof of proposition 1. The value of reelection starting from any period t is V0t =
max[V0t(01); V0t(10); V0t(11); V0t(00)]. We obtain from Lemma 3 and equation (23) that
V0t = V0t(00) = T . This implies that
V0t+1 = T:
We obtain, from Theorem 1 and equations (23) to (26), that
V0t(11) = V0t(00)) C(x1t; x2t) = T ;
and that
V0t(00)  V0t(10)) C1(x1t)  p1T ;
V0t(00)  V0t(01)) C2(x2t)  p2T:
The politicians per period payo¤ is T   C(x1t; x2t) = (1   )T . Moreover, suppose
C(x1t; x2t) = C1(x1t)+C2(x2t). Then, there exist a unique stationary equilibrium, x1t = x1
and x2t = x2, with
C1(x

1) = p1T ;
C2(x

2) = p1T:
Proof of proposition 2. The value of reelection starting from any period t is V0t =
max[V0t(01); V0t(10); V0t(11); V0t(00)]. We obtain from Lemma 4 that V0t = V0t(11) for all
t. Iterative, forward substitution, using equation (26), yields
V0t =
1X
k=0
k(T   C(x1t+k; x2t+k)):
For sequences of stationary standards, we get
V0t = V0t+1 =
T   C(x1; x2)
1   :
Substituting for V0t+1 =
T C(x1;x2)
1  , we get that
V0t(11) = V0t(10)) (SC 1 )
and
V0t(11) = V0t(01)) (SC 2 ):
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Finally, V0t =
T C(x1;x2)
1  for all t implies that the politician gets T   C(x1; x2) per pe-
riod. This is strictly greater than (1   )T because V0t(11) > V0t(00) by Lemma 4. For
uniqueness, see proposition 3 in Aidt and Dutta (2004)
9 Appendix II
In this appendix, we derive the political cost function under federalism. Suppose the
politician wants to satisfy both regions. He, then, solves the following problem each
period (where we have omitted subscript t for simplicity):
min
k1;k2;s1;s2
k1 + k2 + n1s1 + n2s2
subject to
x1  2k
1
2
1   2k
1
2
2 + s1
x2  2k
1
2
2   2k
1
2
1 + s2
Under the assumption that  < n2
n1
, k1 and k2 are (weakly) positive at the optimum. It is
useful to distinguish between four cases:
1. s1 > 0, s2 > 0
2. s1 = s2 = 0
3. s1 = 0, s2 > 0
4. s1 > 0, s2 = 0
Case 1: Substituting the two constraints, which must be binding at the optimum, into
the objective function and taking the rst derivatives with respect to k1 and k2 yields:
1  n1k
 1
2
1 + n2k
 1
2
1 = 0
1  n2k
 1
2
2 + n1k
 1
2
2 = 0:
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Solving this, we get k1 = (n1   n2)2 and k 2 = (n2   n1)2. The per capita transfers are
s1 = x1   2 (n1   n2) + 2 (n2   n1) = x1   2n1
 
1 + 2

+ 4n2
s2 = x2   2 (n2   n1) + 2 (n1   n2) = x2   2n2
 
1 + 2

+ 4n1
Notice that si > 0 requires that xi > 2ni (1 + 2)  4n i. The political cost function is
C (x1; x2) = (n1   n2)2 + (n2   n1)2
+n1
 
x1   2n1
 
1 + 2

+ 4n2

+n2
 
x2   2n2
 
1 + 2

+ 4n1

Case 2: This case applies for x1  n1 (1 + 2) 2n2 and x2  n2 (1 + 2) 2n1. We need
to make a distinction between three sub-cases. Firstly, let   0 and min
n
x1
x2
; x2
x1
o
>  
or  < 0 and min fx1; x2g > 0. Then, both constraints are binding and we can solve
them to get the lowest spending level on the two local public goods that will generate the
required utility levels:
k1 =

x1 + x2
2 (1  2)
2
k2 =

x2 + x1
2 (1  2)
2
and the cost function is
C (x1; x2) =

x1 + x2
2 (1  2)
2
+

x2 + x1
2 (1  2)
2
:
Notice that C (0; 0) = 0. Secondly, suppose that the constraint for group 1 is not binding.
First, if   0, then k1 = 0 and k2 =
 
x2
2
2
and
C (x1; x2) =
x2
2
2
for x1   x2:
Second, if  < 0, the politician solves
min k1 + k2
subject to
x2  2k
1
2
2   2k
1
2
1 :
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Letting  be the multiplier on the constraint, we can write the rst order conditions as
1  k 
1
2
2  = 0
1 + k
  1
2
1  = 0
Solving for k1 and k2 and substituting into the constraint yields
 =
x2
2 (1 + 2)
and we nd that k2 =

x2
2(1+2)
2
and k1 =

x2
2(1+2)
2
for x2  0. The political cost
function is
C (x1; x2) =

x2
2 (1 + 2)
2
+

x2
2 (1 + 2)
2
=
x22
4 (1 + 2)
for x1 < 0:
Third, suppose that the constraint for group 2 is not binding. By analogy we get for   0
that k2 = 0 and k1 =
 
x1
2
2
and
C (x1; x2) =
x1
2
2
for x2   x1:
For  < 0, we get
C (x1; x2) =
x21
4 (1 + 2)
for x2 < 0:
Case 3: Substituting s2 out from the beginning, we can write the Lagrange function as
L = k1 + k2 + n2

x2   2k
1
2
2 + 2k
1
2
1

+  

x1   2k
1
2
1 + 2k
1
2
2

where  is a Lagrange multiplier. We can calculate the rst order conditions:
1 + n2k
 1
2
1    k
 1
2
1 = 0 (34)
1  n2k
 1
2
2 +  k
 1
2
2 = 0 (35)
x1   2k
1
2
1 + 2 k
1
2
2 = 0 (36)
Solve equations (34) and (35) to get
k1 = (   n2)2
k2 = (n2    )2 :
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Substitute this in equation (36) and solve for  :
 = max

x1 + 4n2
2 (1 + 2)
; 0

:
Using this, we get that for  > 0, x1 > 4n2
k1 =

x1 + 4n2
2 (1 + 2)
  n2
2
=

x1 + 2n2 (1  2)
2 (1 + 2)
2
k2 =

n2   x1 + 4n2
2 (1 + 2)
2
=

2n2 (1  2)  x1
2 (1 + 2)
2
s2 = x2   2

2n2 (1  2)  x1
2 (1 + 2)

+ 2

x1 + 2n2 (1  2)
2 (1 + 2)

and the political cost function is
C (x1; x2) =

x1 + 2n2 (1  2)
2 (1 + 2)
2
+

2n2 (1  2)  x1
2 (1 + 2)
2
+n2

x2   2

2n2 (1  2)  x1
2 (1 + 2)

+ 2

x1 + 2n2 (1  2)
2 (1 + 2)

:
We notice that s2 > 0 requires that x2 >
2(n2(1 22+4) x1)
(1+2)
. For x1  4n2,  = 0. The
rst order conditions are
1 + n2k
 1
2
1  0
1  n2k
 1
2
2  0:
For   0, k1 = 0 and k2 = (n2)2 and the cost function is
C (x1; x2) = (n2)
2 + n2 (x2   2n2) :
For  < 0, k2 = (n2)
2 and k1 = (n2)
2 and the cost function is
C (x1; x2) = (n2)
2 (1 + 2) + n2
 
x2   2n2(1 + 2)

:
Case 4: This is similar to case 3. For  > 0, x2 > 4n1, we get
k1 =

n1   x2 + 4n1
2 (1 + 2)
2
=

2n1 (1  2)  x2
2 (1 + 2)
2
k2 =

x2 + 4n1
2 (1 + 2)
  n1
2
=

x1 + 2n1 (1  2)
2 (1 + 2)
2
s1 = x1   2

2n1 (1  2)  x2
2 (1 + 2)

+ 2

x2 + 2n1 (1  2)
2 (1 + 2)

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and the political cost function is
C (x1; x2) =

x1 + 2n1 (1  2)
2 (1 + 2)
2
+

2n1 (1  2)  x2
2 (1 + 2)
2
+n1

x1   2

2n1 (1  2)  x2
2 (1 + 2)

+ 2

x2 + 2n1 (1  2)
2 (1 + 2)

:
We notice that s1 > 0 requires that x1 >
2(n1(1 22+4) x2)
(1+2)
. For x2  4n1,  = 0. For
  0, k2 = 0 and k1 = (n1)2 and the cost function is
C (x1; x2) = (n1)
2 + n1 (x1   2n1) :
For  < 0, k1 = (n1)
2 and k2 = (n1)
2 and the cost function is
C (x1; x2) = (n1)
2 (1 + 2) + n1
 
x1   2n1(1 + 2)

:
Now, suppose that the politician will only try to satisfy the demands of group i. There
are two cases to consider:
1. si > 0.
2. si = 0.
Case 1: The politician solves
min
ki;k i;si
ki + k i + nisi
subject to xi  si + 2k
1
2
i   2k
1
2
 i. The optimal choice is
ki = (ni)
2 and k i = 0 for   0
and
ki = (ni)
2 and k i = (ni)
2 for  < 0:
The transfer is
si =
8<: xi   2ni for   0xi   2ni(1 + 2) for  < 0
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The political cost function is
Ci (xi) =
8<: (ni)
2 + ni(xi   2ni) for   0
(1 + 2) (ni)
2 + ni(xi   2ni(1 + 2)) for  < 0
:
Notice that for   0, xi > 2ni for si > 0 and for  < 0, xi > ni2(1 + 2) for si > 0.
Case 2: First, if   0, then ki =
 
xi
2
2
and k i = 0 and
C (xi) =
xi
2
2
for x i   xi:
Second, if  < 0, the politician solves
min
ki;k i
ki + k i
subject to
xi  2k
1
2
i   2k
1
2
 i:
Letting  be the multiplier on the constraint, we can write the rst order conditions as
1  k 
1
2
i  = 0;
1 + k
  1
2
 i  = 0:
Solving for k1 and k2 and substituting into the constraint yields
 =
xi
2 (1 + 2)
;
and we nd that ki =

xi
2(1+2)
2
and k i =

xi
2(1+2)
2
for xi  0. The political cost
function is
C (xi) =

xi
2 (1 + 2)
2
+

xi
2 (1 + 2)
2
=
x2i
4 (1 + 2)
for xi < 0:
In the text, we focus on the case where, at equilibrium, the politician o¤ers local
public goods and transfers. This requires that tax revenues are su¢ ciently large. More
specically, it requires the following.
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1. Under [R], each regional politician spends ki = (ni)
2 and xit 2ni+2n i on transfers.
The equilibrium payo¤ is
xRit =
Ti
ni
  ni + 2(ni   n i).
Substitute this into the expression for the transfer and note that si > 0 requires that
Ti >
(ni)
2

for i = 1; 2.
2. Under [F], two cases can arise. For   0, we can, using proposition 2, write the
payo¤ to group i at time t as
xF1t =
Tp1 + n
2
1 +  (1  p1) (n22   4n1n2 + n21)
n1
xF2t =
Tp2 + n
2
2 +  (1  p2) (n21   4n1n2 + n22)
n2
The transfers are
s1 = x1   2 (n1   n2) + 2 (n2   n1) = x1   2n1
 
1 + 2

+ 4n2
s2 = x2   2 (n2   n1) + 2 (n1   n2) = x2   2n2
 
1 + 2

+ 4n1
At equilibrium, they are positive for
T > max
i

n2i (1 + 
2 (1 + pi))  4n1n2pi + n2 i2 (1  pi)
pi

:
For  < 0, we can, using proposition 1, dene the minimum equilibrium payo¤s as 
1 + 2

(ni)
2 + ni(xi   2ni(1 + 2)) = piT:
Solving this yields xit = 1ni (Tpi + n
2
i (
2 + 1)). si > 0, then, requires that
xi > 2ni
 
1 + 2

+ 4n i
or
T > max
i

ni
pi
 
4n i + ni
 
2 + 1

:
So, overall we need
T > max
i

ni
pi
 
4n i + ni
 
2 + 1

;
n2i (1 + 
2 (1 + pi))  4n1n2pi + n2 i2 (1  pi)
pi

:
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10 Appendix III
The rent, RF , extracted by the federal politician is T  C(xF1 ; xF2 ) where C(xF1 ; xF2 ) is given
in equation (11) and
xFi =
1
2
T + 1 + 2(1  1
2
)(   2) for i = 1; 2: (37)
Substitution yields equation (20). A comparison yields that q1RF > 12 (1  )T if and
only if
q1 >
1
2
(1  )T
RF
(38)
and that (1  q1)RF > 12 (1  )T if and only if
q1 < 1 
1
2
(1  )T
RF
: (39)
Substitution of RF into equation (39) yields q1. We notice that q1 >
1
2
because
1
2
(1  )T + 2 (1  ) (2  )
(1  )T + 2 (1  ) (2  )  
1
2
=
(2  ) 
(T + 4   22) > 0. (40)
This implies that there exist values of q1 such that both regional politician benet from
centralization. Moreover,
@q1
@
=
2 (1  )T
(T + 4   22)2 > 0 (41)
for  < n2
n1
< 1.
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